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Viral transmission pathways have profound implications for public safety; thus it is im-
perative to establish an accurate and complete understanding of viable infectious avenues.
Whether SARS-CoV-2 is airborn is currently uncertain1, 2. While mounting evidence sug-
gests it could be transmitted via the air in confined spaces3, 4, the airborn transmission mode
has not yet been demonstrated. Here we show that the quantitative analysis of several re-
ported superspreading events points towards aerosol mediated transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
Aerosolized virus emitted by an infected person in an enclosed space will accumulate until
virion emission and virion destabilization are balanced, resulting in a steady-state concen-
tration C∞. The timescale to accumulation leads to significantly enhanced exposure when
virus-carrying aereosol droplets are inhaled for longer duration co-occupancy. Reported su-
perspreading events are found to trace out a single value of the calculated virion exposure,
suggesting a universal minimum infective dose (MID) via aerosol. The MID implied by our
analysis is comparable to the measured MIDs for influenza A (H2N2)5, 6, the virus responsi-
ble for the 1957-1958 asian flu pandemic. Our model suggests that the likelihood for aerosol-
mediated transmission reduces significantly when there is filtration at a rate exceeding the
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destabilization rate of aerosolized SARS-CoV-2.
The infectious pathways of a virus determine its course as it infects a host population. De-
spite clear guidelines on social distancing and lock-down policies7, SARS-CoV-2 has proven to
be an extremely challenging virus to successfully contain due in part to its prolonged symtom-
less incubation period8, 9. Mask-wearing has proven to be marginally effective in reducing viral
transmission10, but not all infectious particles are captured by typical surgical masks11. Whether
a virus is transmitted is fundamentally governed by the virus shedding rate of the infected person,
the minimal infective dose (MID) necessary to cause an infection and the transmission pathway
mediating virus material delivery to a potential host.
The pathway for transmission of respiratory viruses via droplets depends on their size, as
depicted schematically in Fig.1 a. For small droplets with radius a below 5 microns settling in
quiescent air, the gravitational force Fg = 4/3 pi ρ g a3, is balanced by Stokes drag acting on the
droplet, Fd = 6piaµv. The droplet thus descends at a velocity v of 3 meters per hour. Prevailing
currents in a typical room driven by convection, active ventilation or movement of people signifi-
cantly exceed this settling velocity. Consequently, aerosolized droplets will remain suspended for
hours, dispersing widely in an occupied room within minutes3, 12. Because aerosolized droplets
remain in suspension long enough to thoroughly mix, the physical distance between persons in
an enclosed space becomes irrelevant; exposure to the airborn virus is controlled only by the con-
centration of virus particles in the air. This is in contrast to large respiratory droplet transmission.
Indeed, a droplet’s settling velocity increases quadratically with its radius, so that large droplets
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only remain suspended for seconds before they fall to the ground, leading to a limited spatial range
of infectivity13–15, and serving as motivation for the current social distancing guidelines. Here we
consider virus transport by small aerosol-sized droplets only. Direct measurements of hospital
air have identified SARS-CoV-2 material in aerosols16, but exposed healthcare workers in hospi-
tal environments were not infected1, 2, casting doubt on the airborn transmission pathway despite
demonstrable viral content in aerosol form.
The viral titer of SARS-CoV-2, or the concentration of infectious viral particles, has been
shown to decay exponentially in air at a timescale of one hour for SARS-CoV-217. The aerosol
emission rate of infected persons is believed to vary widely between infected persons. Under
typical conditions, the aerosol emission rate of some persons infected with other types of corona
viruses was measured to exceed 10, 000 viral particles in a half-hour period, with the majority
of infected persons emitting no measurable aerosol virus18. As we will show, infected persons
shedding via aerosol at average rates have the potential to trigger superspreading events.
Exposure to the virus does not ensure that it will successfully infect, as a virus must first
cross the body’s protective barriers. Known viruses are infectious at various exposure thresholds,
or minimum infective doses (MIDs), as low as a few hundred viral particles in the case of influenza
A (H2N2) and SARS-CoV-15, 6. More virulent diseases can even infect at substantially lower
exposures5. Such a threshold likely exists for SARS-CoV-26, though it has yet to be determined.
No airborn transmission of SARS-Cov-2 was detected among exposed medical workers in a
hospital environment1, 2; however, hospitals typically have strong requirements for air refreshment
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and filtration that do not apply to gyms or bars. Indeed, low air refreshment rates facilitate the
accumulation of virions, which are neither expelled nor filtered from the environment3, 19. To study
the effect of virus accumulation in such environments, we use straightforward conservation laws
of aerosol-born virions to formulate an expression for the time-rate-of-change of the volumetric
concentration of virus particles in aerosol form C(t) at time t in terms of a viral source s, in
number of aerosol-born viral particles shed per time, and a destabilization rate γ, the fraction of
viral particles in aerosol that lose their virality per unit time, as dC(t)
dt
= s/V − γC(t). Here V is
room volume. If the room air is filtered or replenished, a third term γfiltC(t) is subtracted from the
right-hand side of this equation yielding an effective destabilization rate that combines the natural
decay and filtration. The effect of filtration on aerosolized SARS-CoV-2 concentration is presented
in Fig. 1 of the extended material.
We assume that the flow within the room under consideration is well-mixed within minutes;
this is fast compared to 1/γ, which is 1 hour for SARS-CoV-217. Because the air is well mixed,
the complex spatio-temporal evolution of aerosol distribution can be represented by the uniform
virion concentration C(t), which is a function of time only. We depict this scenario schematically
in Fig. 1 a. The expression C(t) = s
γV
(1− e−γt) describes the temporal evolution of C, as shown
in Fig. 1 b.
While the viral shedding rate for SARS-CoV-2 has not yet been measured, the shedding rate
of other corona viruses has been measured at over 20, 000 virions / hour18. Among a group of
aerosol-shedding virus-positive persons, the average number of virions shed per hour was s =
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32, 600 virions / hour. We use this value for s throughout this study, as described in Methods. We
can now calculate the steady-state concentration of virions C∞ for an infectious person in a room
of a given size. A single infected person shedding aerosolized virus in a large room of 300 cubic
meters yields C∞ = 109 virions/m3, while in a smaller space of 40 cubic meters gives a much
larger C∞ = 814 virions/m3. This steady-state concentration is reached after a transient period
given by the inverse destabilization rate of the virus; since γ is 1/hour, short-term occupancy is
unlikely to reach the steady-state concentration, significantly reducing virion exposure in transient
encounters.
Is an occupant likely to be infected at such concentrations? To answer this question, we
calculate the virion exposure Nexp, recognizing that it must exceed a minimum infective dose
(MID). Nexp is given by the time-integral of the respiration rate of a room occupant, Q˙, as Nexp =∫ T
0 C(t)Q˙dt, where Q˙ is the respiration rate. The average adult at rest takes 12 breaths per minute,
cycling a volume of 0.5 liters / breath; this amounts to a total respiration rate of 360 liters per hour,
or Q˙ = 0.36m3 / hour. Thus, Nexp with a single infected occupant in the above cases is 14 and
108 per hour, respectively. We see the pronounced effect of the approach to steady-state when
we evaluate Nexp for 30 minutes: it is 4 and 31 particles, respectively; thus it is less than 1/3 the
exposure for twice that time period.
The minimum infectious dose (MID) for aerosolized SARS-CoV-2 is currently unknown;
however, other viruses provide a guide for estimating this value. The MID of human respiratory
viruses varies greatly and depends on the infection pathways. Very infectious viruses including
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the aggressive Influenza A (H2N2), adenoviruses and SARS-CoV-1, fall between several tens to
several hundreds of virions5, 6, 20. We note that Nexp exceeds 50 in under 40 minutes for the 40 m3
room, but it takes over 2 hours for Nexp to exceed 50 in the 300 m3 room; thus, the likelihood of
infection depends strongly on room volume. This analysis can be generalized for arbitrary times
and room volumes; we present several iso-Nexp curves as a function of time and room volume in
Fig. 2. Regrettably, at room volumes that are typically encountered in daily activities, and over
timescales of co-occupancy of the order of hours, we observe iso-Nexp values that fall within the
range of the MIDs reported for other aerosol-transmissible viruses5, 6.
The model together with reasonable estimates for parameter values yields exposure doses
compatible with minimum invective doses reported for other aerosol-transmissable viruses and
thus suggests that airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is possible. To asses the viablity of
aerosolized SARS-CoV-2 transmission despite unknown minimal infective dose information, we
analyse reported super-spreading events. For each dataset used in our analysis, the number of vi-
ral shedders is known, the room volume is reported or easily estimated using available data, and
identical co-occupancy time is documented. In order to isolate the effects of aerosol transmis-
sion from the more common pathway of direct contact or ballistic droplets, the interactions should
predominantly take place between non-related persons, where close proximal interaction is less
likely. These requirements are met for several well-documented superspreading events21–24, in par-
ticular for a lunch period at a restaurant24, where CCTV footage documented the non-interaction
between adjacent persons and tables, thus underscoring the importance of the aerosol transmission
mechanism. Furthermore, a superspreading event reported at a meat processing plant in Germany
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took place after strict social distancing and hygiene measures were put in place, strictly suppress-
ing the pathway for SARS-CoV-2 infection via close physical contact25. Each of these events is
documented, and the rationale for parameter values is annotated, in Methods.
We now compare the room volume and co-occupancy time for the sub-set of events that
involve a single viral shedder at a resting respiratory rate, corresponding to the parameter values
used to calculate the iso-Nexp in Fig. 2. Among the five events with a single identified virus shedder
at the resting respiration rate, the data fall within a remarkably consistent range ofNexp between 50
and 100, as shown in Fig. 2. This tight range of Nexp that leads to super-spreading events suggests
a possible unique MID via aerosol transmission for SARS-CoV-2 of Nexp ≈ 50.
If the value of Nexp ≈ 50 is indeed the MID for aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2, it
should independently arise under further analysis. We test this hypothesis by extending our analy-
sis to other super-spreading events with identical co-occupancy with different respiration rates22 or
number of spreaders23. Using the same analysis framework, but accounting for these modifications
of source number or respiration rate as described in the extended material?, we tabulate and graph
the predictions of Nexp, along with the data plotted in Figure 2. We find that with the exception of
two events that involve documented close physical contact23, 26, all cases fall within the anticipated
range of Nexp ≈ 50 virions, as can be seen in Fig. 3.
Using a simple mathematical model for virion accumulation and exposure, we find that sev-
eral superspreading events involving over 100 infections with SARS-CoV-2 suggest the same range
of minimal infective dose of Nexp ≈ 50 virions. The accumulation dynamics emphasize the im-
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portance of transient behavior, as has been previously identified in studies of store occupancy in
Italy19 using a similar mathematical framework.
Our model is built upon two key parameters: first, the rate of virion shedding by an infected
person18, and second the virion destabilization rate17. We additionally assume that filtration is
slow compared to the viral destabilization rate. However, this framework also emphasizes the
importance of filtration as we present in detail in extended material Fig. 1?. If the volumetric
exchange of air is greater than one or two room volumes per hour, C∞ can be reduced by a factor
of two. In hospital environments, where the air filtration rate can exceed 10 volumes per hour,
our model suggests that Nexp over several hours can be reduced approximately 10-fold. Such a
reduction would potentially reduce Nexp below the MID for SARS-CoV-2. This might explain
why exposed medical workers in a hospital environment were not infected1, 2.
Within the framework of aerosol transmission by accumulation, superspreading events sug-
gest minimum infective doses of SARS-CoV-2 commensurate with other infectious viruses, in-
cluding the influenza-A (H2N2) strand that caused the 1957-’58 influenza pandemic5, 6. Indeed,
our study suggests that in terms the infective dose for aerosolized transmission, SARS-CoV-2
behaves much like a particular flu - unfortunately, the H2N2 flu strand that generated a global pan-
demic. The evidence for the potential airborn transmission for SARS-CoV-2 is by now sufficient
to form a scientific consensus3, 4, 12; however, the significance of this transmission mode has not yet
been directly demonstrated. Under the condition that virions are transported by aerosol droplets,
data from several reported superspreading events all indicate the same narrow range of infectious
8
dose. This points towards the practical relevance of aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
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Methods
Determination of parameter values. There are 3 primary parameters that are used to calculate
Nexp: s, Q˙ and γ. s represents the source strength in units of aerosolized virions per hour, Q˙ is the
respiratory volume per hour and γ is the proportion of aerosolized viruses that destabilize in one
hour.
s is currently unknown for SARS-CoV-2. In order to constrain this parameter, we evaluate the
number of virions emitted per hour on average for three other human corona viruses: HCoV-NL63,
HCoV-OC43 and HCoV-HKU118. Within the sampling of these viruses, all three were represented
in aerosol shedding, and a total of 4 of 10 total infected persons shed aerosolized virus in this
study18. The number of virions shed varied from 660 to 57,000 in 1/2 hour; 16,300 were shed on
average, corresponding to an average value of s = 32, 600 virions / hour. This value of s is used
throughout the manuscript. Notably, smight vary depending on the activity reported - for example,
singing21 or exercise22 might augment the value of s; as we have no way of determining how s
could vary under these circumstances, we retain the same value in all calculations. It is furthermore
interesting to note that both the aerosol virus shedding rates, and the fraction of infected persons
shedding aerosolized virus, are commensurate for three analyzed corona viruses and two infuenza
viruses18, suggesting that there could be similarities between these families of viruses, as was
previously noted6.
The respiratory rate Q˙ for an adult person is known to be 12 breaths per hour, and the volume
per breath is 0.5 liters on average. This corresponds to Q˙ = 0.36 m3 / hour; this value is used for
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all calculations except the high-intensity fitness class22, where an elevated Q˙ = 1.08 m3 / hour is
used, corresponding to a three-fold higher respiratory rate.
γ was extracted directly from data collected for aerosolized SARS-CoV-217. In a one hour
period, the viral titer drops by approximately e−1, setting γ = 1 / hour. A second study suggested
that aerosolized virus can remain infectious for a far longer period27; however, these data do not
convey a convincing trend, and the data are significantly less dense than in the study used here to
determine γ17.
Obtaining values for V , T and number of shedders The formulation of our model requires
an accurate determination of the room volume V , the co-occupancy period T and the number of
aerosol-based virion shedders to calculate Nexp. While some studies report these values, for exam-
ple by including full spatial maps of the environment25, others report partial data for V without the
room height22, 24, or no data at all for V other than a venue description21, 23. Typically, values for
T were very well constrained, including co-occupancy times down to the minute, recorded with
CCTV footage of the incident in one case24. In total, the data collected comprise 20 discrete events,
with all but the fitness class comprising a single event. The fitness classes involved 12 different
events, driven by the simultaneous infection of several fitness class instructors at a training event
prior to the several classes held in the following week22. The data evaluated in this manuscript
correspond to a total of 207 infections with over 1100 documented persons exposed.
There was typically a single documented infector for the superspreading events analyzed
here. For the tour group, there were likely two infectors from a co-travelling sub-group of a 20
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person tour (cluster A)23. A single infector is most likely for all the other events, although the
morning shift workers at the German meat processing facility were exposed by a primary infector
who worked and lived with a potential secondary infector (labeled B1 and B2), where the first
co-exposure took place on the day prior to the three days of total exposure during shift work25.
The Jordanian wedding event was triggered by a primary source who had close contact with a
large number of participants in two days prior to the two hour wedding, and likely had close
contact with a large number of attendees during the wedding itself, as the primary source was the
bride’s father26; as such, non-aerosol pathways cannot be ruled out and are indeed likely to have
contributed to the scale of the outbreak. A short duration encounter with two sources in Singapore
also included close inter-personal contact at a health products shop, where interactions likely took
place via person to person contact (cluster A, health products shop)23; thus, also in this event
non-aerosol mediated infection is likely.
Values for V were reported directly25, calculated from the reported floor area22, 24 with an
estimated ceiling height range, or estimated / calculated from alternative sources21, 23, 26. For the
German meat processing facility the full dimensions of the shared shift space were provided; we
used only the proximal floor space in our analysis, as walls separated this volume from the remain-
der of the plant25. The Jordanian wedding took place at an indoor facility designed to accomodate
approximately 400 guests26; estimating approximately 16 m2 per 10 persons yields a floor area
of approximately 640 m2; with a room height of 3 to 5 meters, we obtain a volume estimate of
approximately 2600 ±700 m3. Similar considerations were used to determine the size of the con-
ference dinner facility in cluster B for a total of 100 conference attendees23. The choral practice
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event took place in Skagit county, Washington21. The choir’s website provides photos of the choral
practice room prior to the outbreak, enabling measurements of the floor area with an uncertainty of
a few meters per dimension28. Neither the jewelry store, the health products shop, nor the church
included values of V or floor space23; in each of these cases, between 5 and 10 google street view
images of stores belonging to these categories were analyzed, and appropriately wide error bounds
were used for V . The Korean fitness class events reported a room size of approximately 60 m222,
and a floorplan was provided for the Chinese restaurant lunch24. In both cases, room heights were
not provided and are estimated between 3 and 4 meters. For the Chinese restaurant lunch, the total
restaurant area was served by two primary air conditioners. We selected the zone of the restaurant
served by the air conditioner where the infected person sat, as this was a distinct zone within the
restaurant24.
The period of co-occupancy T was reported in either minutes or fractions of an hour, and
is thus tightly constrained for each event. For the German meat processing plant, three morning
shifts over a span of three days were reported as exposed. A total of two hours of breaks were
reported during these shifts; thus we use a 6 hour period per shift25. The total period of exposure
thus constitutes 18 hours. In our analysis, we explicitly ignore any effects outside of these shifts
including metabolism or decay of virions during off hours, for example.
The number of superspreading events we analyze is not comprehensive, as there are signif-
icantly more superspreading events that have been identified in the literature; however, it is not
common practice to include the precise size of the space, or even the time duration of the interac-
tion, and thus these events are excluded from this analysis. Furthermore, a significantly number
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of better documented superspreading events were clearly associated with close inter-personal con-
tact (e.g. families, roommates, etc.) and thus are not compatible with the analytical framework
presented here.
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Figure 1: Aerosolization of viral cargo in an enclosed space. a) A schematic of a closed room with
volume V . An infected person can emit both rapidly sedimenting respiratory droplets and aerosol-
sized particles when breathing, speaking, coughing or sneezing. Particles with a diameter of 5
µm sediment in quiescent air at a rate of 3 m/hour. These particles are readily dispersed by room
currents set up by air conditioning, thermal gradients and background flow of the room air. b) For
aerosolized virus emitted into an enclosed space, the rate of emission will ultimately be balanced
by the destabilization rate; these dynamics lead to the evolution of aerosolized virus concentration
plotted here. A non-infected occupant breathing at a constant rate in the same space is exposed to
Nexp particles over time (right axis).
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Figure 2: Curves of constant aerosolized virion exposure for a fixed source strength and breathing
rate. Nexp, the number of viral particles a room occupant is exposed to, is calculated as a function
of room volume V and occupancy time T . Nexp is indicated on each curve. Data from several
super-spreading events21, 23–25 with a single spreading source in non-exercise scenarios are plotted
on the graph, with error bars indicated for the events. Details of these events, and assumptions
used in the calculation of the iso-Nexp curves are included in Methods.
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Figure 3: Tabulated data for several super-spreading events. A total of 20 distinct superspreading
events21–26 for SARS-CoV-2 are analyzed, and the parameter values used to formulate the predic-
tion for numerical value of viral particle exposure Nexp are presented. The predicted value for
Nexp is plotted on the graph at the right. The predicted value is shown using a red diamond, and
the range of predicted values are shown using the blue rectangles. A detailed discussion of how
the range is established is provided in Methods. Note that there were two sources for the events at
the health products shop and the jewelry shop23, and the estimated respiratory rate is elevated for
the fitness classes22; these directly alter the Npred.
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